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ABSTR ACT
Th is volume contains thirteen papers which were presented at a conference held in Budapest in 
2008 at the fi ftieth anniversary of the publication of Personal Knowledge. Most of these essays are 
excellent examples of contemporary Polanyi scholarship, and they can be interesting and useful 
for not only Polanyi experts, but for those who are interested in any areas of philosophy.
Th e volume has two parts: the fi rst (Knowing) is devoted to Polanyi’s theory of knowledge, 
the second (Being) includes essays about interpretations of his metaphysical views. Among 
the essays we can fi nd both analytical and historical interpretations. Th e authors come from 
diff erent nations and diff erent scholarly fi elds. Most of the them examine Polanyi’s views 
in both contexts, and attempted to give both philologically and philosophically reasonable 
interpretation of his complex and original views. Th e title of the book refers to a collection of 
papers of Michael Polanyi which was published with the same title in 1969.
Keywords: conference papers, emergence, epistemology, hermeneutics, liberty, moral values, 
ontology, philosophy of science, Polanyi scholarship, reductionism, tacit knowledge.
Although many excellent scholarly monographs have already been published about 
Polanyi’s philosophy and life, still there are few signifi cant collections of cutting-
edge essays of Polanyi scholarship. Th is volume contains thirteen papers which 
were presented at a conference held in Budapest in 2008 at the fi ftieth anniversary 
of the publication of Personal Knowledge. Th e title of the book refers to a collection 
of papers of Michael Polanyi which was published with the same title in 1969.
Th e volume has two parts: the fi rst (Knowing) is devoted to Polanyi’s theory 
of knowledge, the second (Being) includes essays about interpretations of his 
metaphysical views. Among the essays we can fi nd both analytical and historical 
interpretations. Th e authors come from diff erent nations and diff erent scholarly 
fi elds: there are philologists who specialized in Polanyi, philosophers of science, 
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phenomenologists, and analytically trained epistemologists also. Most of the them 
examine Polanyi’s views in both contexts, and attempted to give both philologically 
and philosophically reasonable interpretation of his complex and original views. 
It is almost impossible to precisely classify Polanyi’s unique philosophy. Partly 
because the eff ort to put a simple label on his work, he is often mentioned as one of 
the ‘post-positivist’ philosophers of science. Th ough this description is not entirely 
misleading, it is worth keeping in mind that Polanyi’s theory of knowledge cannot 
be separated from his views about being, morality, freedom, values, the role of the 
science in society and other questions. 
Although the thirteen papers mostly deal with knowing and being (namely, 
Polanyi’s theory of knowledge and metaphysics), the authors analyse Polanyi’s 
views about liberty, moral values of science, his contribution to social sciences, his 
ideas concerning evolution, philosophy of mind, artifi cial intelligence, and many 
other topics.    
In the following I would like to present short summaries of some of the essays. 
I don’t want to go through all of the thirteen papers of the volume, rather I would 
like to introduce some of the papers according to the diff erent issues. However, as I 
have mentioned before, we have to keep in mind that Polanyi’s views about various 
topics are closely related to each other. 
Th e fi rst essay, Michael Polanyi’s Use of Gestalt Psychology, is a great example of a 
mixed approach of analytical and historical interpretations. It’s well known that 
the discoveries of Gestalt psychology play a central role in Polanyi’s philosophy. Phil 
Mullins gives a lucid and deep analysis of the development of Polanyi’s theory of 
personal knowledge, and investigates how Polanyi has used and transformed the 
insights of Gestalt psychology at diff erent periods. Furthermore, Mullins examines 
historical and conceptual connections between Polanyi’s epistemological views 
which are inspired by Gestalt psychology, his early criticism of planned science and 
totalitarian state, his vision of a society of free explorers, the views of two diff erent 
kinds of order, and his late conception of meaning. 
Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowledge is probably the most widely known one of his 
ideas among philosophers and the laity as well, however numerous popularized 
and oversimplifi ed formulations still remain. Iwo Zmys´lony’s paper, Various ideas of 
tacit knowledge - Is there a basic one? examines various interpretations of Polanyi’s 
philosophy and dispels some widespread misconceptions about tacit knowledge. 
Zmys´lony gives a deep account of diff erent usages of Polanyi’s central concept in 
diff erent writings. 
Built on a very thorough inquiry of the texts he distinguishes two basic ideas 
of tacit knowing. First, he refers to the knowledge of subsidiary particulars of 
experience. Second, it means the knowledge of how we integrate the indwelled 
particulars. Th e integration is a skill, and like art, it cannot be formulated in entirely 
explicit ways. Zmys´lony interprets these two basic concepts in various contexts. He 
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Icompares Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge with Kuhn’s insights, and analyses 
Polanyi’s ideas in relation to the externalism-internalism debate as well.
Of course, Zmys´lony is not the only contributor who looks for relations and 
similarities between Polanyi’s views and other philosophical traditions. One of the 
greatest virtues of the volume is that it initiates a dialogue and explores possible 
connections between Polanyi’s philosophy and the most signifi cant trends of 20th 
century thought, such as analytical philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
social science, and economical theories.  
Th e similarities between Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge and Ryle’s 
distinction of ‘knowing what’ and ‘knowing how’ are well known. But it is important 
to note that Polanyi himself declared connections between his ideas and other 
philosophical traditions, for instance phenomenology. It is very remarkable that 
Polanyi claimed his notion of ‘indwelling’ is the same as (or at least very similar to) 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘being in the world’.
Yu’s paper, Being-in-the-World in a Polanyian Perspective examines the similarities 
between Heidegger’s phenomenological criticism of Cartesian and positivist 
epistemology, and Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge. Both of them criticized 
the classical philosophical distinction between the theoretical and practical sphere. 
Yu argues that the very similar insights of the two approaches are able to support 
the conclusions of each other and challenge the representational view of human 
cognition which is inspired by Cartesian dualism and theory of ideas. He outlines 
possible ways of an exciting and fruitful dialogue not only between Heidegger and 
Polanyi, but also with Ryle, Wittgenstein, Merlau-Ponty, and with contemporary 
thinkers, for instance Charles Taylor, or Hubert Dreyfus.
Th e next essay, A Rose by another Name? Personal Knowledge and Hermeneutics, 
explores further interesting connections between Polanyi and other philosophical 
traditions. Mulherin points out surprising similarities and analogies between 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. Gadamer’s main 
problem is to elaborate a diff erent view of understanding the truth in humanities 
and arts which contrast with the positivist view of science without falling into 
subjectivism. 
Polanyi also points out that seeking the infallible foundations of knowledge 
usually involves the view that the criterion of truth and the methodological rules 
of justifi cation are objective, universally valid, therefore, impersonal. Although the 
two thinkers did not seem to be familiar with each other’s works, both of them 
opposed to this kind of objectivist view of knowledge, as well as they pointed out that 
fi duciary commitments, skills, appealing to tradition and authority play essential 
role in human cognition.
Apart from these two interesting papers, in the volume we can fi nd essays which 
interpret Polanyi’s philosophy in context of problems of analytical philosophy. Pro 
and contra arguments about reductive physicalism and its viable alternatives, such 
as property dualism already have a huge literature, nevertheless Polanyi’s concept of 
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emergence and his criticism of reductionist theories of mind are less known among 
the analytical philosophers.
Márton Dinnyei’s essay (Downward Causation, or the Tacit Character of the 
World? Approach to a Non-Reductive World-view through Polanyi’s Philosophy) is an 
excellent example for applying Polanyi’s original ideas to the discussions of analytical 
philosophy of mind. He summarizes Kim’s argument, according to which downward 
causation is an untenable consequence of non-reductive physicalism, hence a kind of 
moderate reductive physicalism is the only viable position. However, Dinnyei argues 
for an alternative view built on Polanyi’s ideas of an hierarchical ontology. 
Th e main question is whether Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge supports his 
emergentist ontology. Polanyi claimed that knowledge of the higher level entities 
is not reducible to knowledge of lower entities. According to his famous example: 
Laplace’s demon who has a complete knowledge of microphysical entities, but 
has no capacity of integrating it to a knowledge of meaningful units, is not able to 
recognize a frog as a frog.
Th en Polanyi concludes from his theory of knowledge that the world has layered 
ontological structure. Th e organisms, like machines, are higher-level emergent 
entities, and instead of nomological causal laws we need organizing principles to 
understand these entities. Dinnyei accepts Polanyi’s views, and argues that Kim’s 
objection about downward causation is harmless against this theory.
Th e editor of the volume, Tihamér Margitay’s essay (From Epistemology to Ontology: 
Polanyi’s Arguments for the Layered Ontology) examines and reconstructs Polanyi’s 
argument for layered ontology built on his views of tacit knowledge. He gives a very 
lucid and profound analysis of Polanyi’s arguments. Margitay’s strategy is internal 
criticism, which means that he argues appealing to Polanyi’s own claims. Opposed to 
Dinnyei, Margitay concludes that Polanyi didn’t give suffi  cient and good reasons for 
his conclusion of the correspondence between structure of knowing and structure of 
being. Th e bridge between epistemology and ontology is fragile. However, Margitay 
argues, a weaker thesis can be defensible: the correspondence between the structure 
of personal knowledge  and the ontological features of persons. So if Polanyi’s theory 
of knowing is correct, then it is safe to say that the “knowledge-like entities” (i. e. 
persons) are emergent in a metaphysical sense.
Th e concept of emergence is the subject of Dániel Paksi’s essay, Polanyi and 
evolution too. Paksi summarizes Polanyi’s views about evolution and emergence. 
He claims that Polanyi’s idea about hierarchical ontology is a consequence of his 
concept of boundary conditions, and argues that Polanyi’s fundamental distinctions 
between living and non-living, machine-like and physical entities can be established. 
Built on Polanyi’s views Paksi argues for a diff erent theory of evolution opposed to 
the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Paksi states that a Polanyian theory of evolution can 
provide a better understanding of the emergence of life.
Polanyi made signifi cant contribution not only to philosophy of science or 
epistemology, but also other fi elds of philosophy, such as moral philosophy, aesthetics 
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Ior political philosophy. Among the essays of the volume we can fi nd several fi ne ones 
which examine Polanyi’s ideas about morality, values, and society. Th ese thoughts, 
of course, are related to his views about knowing and being.
It is an old problem how can we give a comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of moral knowledge and its relation to theoretical knowledge. Paul Lewis’s essay 
Teaching to form Character: A Polanyian Analysis of Practical Reasoning off ers an 
interesting solution. Lewis presents Polanyi’s views of tacit knowing, and compares 
them with the classical Aristotelian views of practical reasoning (phronesis). He 
points out similarities between classical virtue ethics and Polanyi’s ideas. Knowing 
cannot be formulated by explicit rules of justifi cation. Knowledge is based on tacit 
skills which are acquired by the example of a tutor. Similarly, phronesis is a skill 
which is developed through practice by following a model. Lewis argues that Polanyi’s 
conception of tacit knowing helps us better understand the nature of practical 
reasoning, and outlines a promising theory built on Polanyi’s insights.
R. T. Allen’s paper, Emotion, Autonomy and Commitment is a short and exciting 
summary of a possible criticism of modern views of autonomy and the role of the 
emotions, built on Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowing. Allen presents Sartre’s radical 
concept of autonomy, according to which we are able to and have to be totally 
and absolutely free by choosing ourselves (i.e. our beliefs, ideas, commitments). 
Allen claims that this concept of autonomy is analogous with some of the ideas of 
Enlightenment, especially with Kant’s concept of morality.
Built on Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge Allan argues that this radical concept 
of autonomy is incoherent. Th e argument goes like this: the above view of freedom 
is empty because without appealing uncritically to authority, tradition, customs, or 
emotions reasoning and choice would be impossible. Sartre’s man, who seemingly has 
a totally free, self-choosing will, actually could not exist. Th e wholly self-determining 
person cannot will anything, for reasoning and acting always presuppose uncritically 
accepted tacit beliefs. Every choice is necessary based on principles which always 
remain unchosen. Polanyi argues that everybody tacitly, therefore, uncritically 
relies upon some fundamental beliefs as well as trusts in reliability of perception 
and reasoning. As Allan points out, emotions have an essential role in Polanyi’s 
views of knowing and action. According to the theory of tacit knowing we cannot 
think or live without emotions because every belief or act are inevitably attached 
to implicit desires and commitments.
Márta Fehér’s essay, Polanyi on the Moral Dimension of Science examines how the 
moral dimension of science is established by Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. She 
summarizes Polanyi’s post-critical, anti-Cartesian theory of knowledge and his ideas 
about pure science as an essential truth-seeking practice. Fehér fi nds Polanyi’s ideas of 
science a spiritual, idealistic description of a community of free intellectuals who are 
passionately committed to seeking the Truth. Knowledge cannot be without morality 
and rationality because knowing inevitably has a moral character. Th e justifi cation 
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of the claims of science are not based on impersonal, abstract methodological rules, 
but tacit moral rules which committed by a community of scientists.
Science doesn’t need to have special obligations to society because it is only 
concerned with the deeper understanding of nature. Seeking the truth in favour 
of truth itself is the essential goal of science. It can follow and accomplish this goal 
only if it remains free from every social, economical and other external interests 
and infl uences. Scientists must have an autonomous community with their own 
rules and autonomous direction.
Additionally, Fehér investigates the present day condition of science which is 
usually called after Ziman as post-academic science. She invokes Polanyi’s warnings 
of dangers of economical infl uences to science. In the era of post-academic science 
trust in science, and therefore, science itself might be put at risk, when scientists 
serve only technological and economical interests as well asand science becomes 
an instrument of profi t-oriented and practical needs, instead of seeking the truth 
itself.
Apart from the essays which I have introduced in the foregoing, there are three 
additional excellent papers in the volume. David W. Rutledge’s essay Individual 
and Community in a Convivial Order, or Polanyian Optimism analyses the relation 
between the individual and the community from the viewpoint of Polanyi’s post-
critical theory of knowledge.
Paul Richard Blum’s paper (Th e Immortality of the Intellect Revived: Michael Polanyi 
and his Debate with Alan M. Turing) is worth reading not only for Polanyi scholars, 
but for historians of medieval philosophy as well as philosophers who are interested 
in artifi cial intelligence.
Th e last essay of the volume is Walter Gulick’s Th e Social Th ought of Karl and 
Michael Polanyi: Prologue to a Reconciliation. Gulick compares the views of Polanyi 
brothers about economics and society, and points out not only the diff erences 
between their ideas, but interesting connections as well.
My goal was no more than to give an appetizer of the book, and I hope I have managed 
that. Most of these thirteen essays are excellent examples of contemporary Polanyi 
scholarship, and they can be interesting and useful for not only Polanyi experts, but 
for those who are interested in any areas of philosophy.
Nevertheless, I think an introduction which gives a short outlook of Polanyi’s 
thought in a more popular style would have made the volume perhaps more helpful 
for readers who had just started studying Polanyi’s philosophy. But it is important 
to note that the aim of the book was to give a high-quality collection of scholarly 
papers which are presented in an international Polanyi conference, and in my 
opinion, the volume well fulfi ls its purpose.
In the end of the book a list of contributors with their contacts and a detailed 
index makes the volume complete.
